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I. INTRODUCTION
The last decade has witnessed a growing public concern over harm
inflicted on the environment by man. This concern has been translated
into legal mandates that require public officials to consider environmental
effects of the activities they undertake, license or fund." As a result,
decision making processes are being called upon as never before to resolve
complex scientific questions with inherent policy implications.
Whether existing institutions are suited to make such determinations
may be questioned, especially when scientific data is uncertain or when
any decision will be a choice between competing needs of society. One of
the first examples of this new problem was the planning of the Ever-
glades Jetport, located just north of Everglades National Park in the
Big Cypress Swamp. In order to preserve the unique Everglades wilder-
ness, the conservation movement forced abandonment of a 13 million
dollar training airport, intended to later become a major international
airport.
* Research for this comment was supported by the Committee on Legal Issues in
Health Care, Duke University School of Law, under a grant from the National Science
Foundation for the purpose of stimulating law review research on topics with the general
theme, "Scientific Uncertainty and Technology Assessment."
The authors wish to express their appreciation to Professor Joseph Little of the Uni-
versity of Florida College of Law for his helpful comments.
** Senior Law Students, University of Florida.
1. See, e.g., Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87 (1970); Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970) ; National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970); Environmental Quality Improvement Act
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4371-74 (1970); Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49
U.S.C. §§ 1701-42 (1970) ; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 7; Environmental Protection Act, 2 InI. Legis.
Serv. 536 (1970); N.Y. Environmental Conservation L. §§ 1-129 (McKinney 1970).
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This article, through interviews with participants and searches of
agency files, has reconstructed the events of the jetport dispute to reveal
the administrative problems in the solution of environmental issues. The
approach is realistic inasmuch as it considers not only formal decision
making machinery, but also the total context in which such decisions are
made-with input from scientists, politicians, pressure groups and the
press. The inquiry focuses on the capability of the present decisional
system to reach rational results in environmental questions.
II. THE COMPETING VALUES
The jetport involved a conflict of two competing aspects of the
public interest: The need of the community to expand its transportation
system, and the need of the public to protect the valuable resources
represented by the Everglades. In the past, society's primary measure of
progress has been the degree of expansion and development, as expressed
in terms of trade, industry and agriculture. This development has often
been sanctioned by society at the expense of its natural heritage. How-
ever, the new awareness of the results of urban expansion and com-
mercial development on the nation's environment, as in the case of the
Everglades Jetport, has led to a reevaluation and reordering of society's
measures of progress.'
In 1934, Congress enacted legislation which authorized establish-
ment of Everglades National Park "for the benefit and enjoyment of
the people."3 It was officially dedicated in 19474 and attracted over
1,250,000 visitors in 1968. 5 Located at the southernmost tip of Florida,
the Park consists of 1.4 million acres of a unique and complicated eco-
system.' Within its boundaries exist hundreds of species of plants, fish,
2. In most cases, the preservation of the environment flows from a failure to develop,
but this entails a cost which is often placed on a small segment of society. The monetary
benefits which result from developments such as the Everglades Jetport primarily accrue to
the locality and to a lesser extent, to the adjoining region and the nation. In contrast, preser-
vation of the environment affects a large segment of the whole society and in a diffused
way. This aspect of the South Florida environmental problem is thus merely one example
of an issue which sooner or later must be faced by the nation as a whole: how are the dif-
fused but general costs to society to be balanced against local, usually monetary benefits to
a small segment of the society? U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE
BIG CYPRESS SWAMP JETPORT 150-51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as the LEOPOLD RFPORT].
3. Act of May 30, 1934, ch. 371, § 1, 48 Stat. 816, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 410 (1970).
4. 12 Fed. Reg. 4189 (1947).
5. Hearings on the Water Supply, the Environmental, and Jet Airport Problems of
Everglades National Park Before Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 136 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Interior Committee Hearings].
6. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 5. The Park contains the only tropical
marsh vegetation in the United States. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs-NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF ENGINEERING, ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN SOUTH FLORIDA: REPORT OF THE EN-
VIRONMENTAL STUDIES GROUP TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD OP THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCEs--NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, PART II 21 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as the NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDY]. See generally M. DOUGLAS, THE EVERGLADES: RIVER




animals and birds, including twenty-two species of fish and wildlife on
the rare and endangered list.7 Apart from its intrinsic value as a complex
wilderness, the Park serves as a natural scientific laboratory for ecological
studies and provides recreational and educational resources., The natural
functioning of the Everglades directly supports the marine fisheries of at
least the upper third of the Florida Keys which contribute several million
dollars annually to the region's economy.9 It also recharges South Flor-
ida's aquifers which provide a reservoir of water for the coastal popula-
tions and prevents the ocean's salt water from contaminating the coastal
water supplies. 10
Historically, Everglades National Park relied on a slow moving,
flat sheet of water gradually flowing south from Lake Okeechobee." The
region between the northern park boundary and the lake served as a huge
watershed for the Park.'" However, the free flow of water into the Park
has been interrupted by the construction of dikes and canals for flood
control. 13 As a result, a state agency, the Central and Southern Florida
7. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 5. The unusual concentration of birds
in the Park is considered to be one of its special attractions. These birds include the limpkin,
the anhinga, the roseate spoonbill, egrets and other herons including the nearly extinct great
white heron, the wood ibis (which is the only North American stork), the bald eagle (which
is the national bird and now very rare), and many others. NATIONAL AcAoEar STUDY, supra
note 6, at 21.
8. NATIONAL ACADEmY STUDY, supra note 6, at 20-22.
9. The Torguas-Sanibel pink shrimp fishery alone contributes several million dollars.
Other species of shellfish and finfish dependent upon the Everglades contribute another three
million dollars annually in commercial fisheries operations. Shrimp are smaller and the harvest
declines each year following freshwater shortages in the Park. They are directly dependent
upon the proper degree of freshness or brackishness in the estuaries of the Park during their
migratory life cycle. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 162.
10. Salt water, which is 2.5 percent more dense than fresh water, intrudes inland into
an aquifer until it reaches a line at which the water table has risen to a height of 2.5 feet
above sea level. The seawater literally pushes the fresh water back along a surface where the
two come in contact. Below any point on land, the boundary between the fresh and salt
water occurs at a depth at which the fresh water depth is 2.5 percent greater than the depth
below sea level. Thus, it is essential that the water table near the coast be high to prevent salt
water intrusions, as evidenced early in this century when extensive inland drainage was un-
dertaken on the east coast of South Florida. NATIONAL ACADEY STUDY, supra note 6, at
39-41.
11. The drop in elevation from Lake Okeechobee to the sea, a distance of about 100
miles, is only 15 feet. Consequently, the water drops less than two inches per mile, traveling
an almost imperceptible rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet per day. Interior Committee Hearings,
supra note 5, at S.
12. Harte & Socolow, The Everglades: Wilderness Versus Rampant Land Development
in South Florida, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 140, 143 (1971).
13. The State of Florida received some twenty million acres of swamp and overflowed
lands, including the Everglades, under the provisions of the Federal Swamp and Overflow
Lands Act of 1850. In 1851, the Florida Legislature passed an act accepting the federal grant
and providing for a board of internal improvement. In 1855, the Florida Legislature created
the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, whose responsibility was the drainage and
reclamation of swamp and overflowed lands. By 1905, it was apparent that efforts to drain
and reclaim the lands, under jurisdiction of the Trustees, were ineffectual. In the same year,
the Florida Legislature passed a new act creating the Everglades Drainage District. In 1926
and again in 1928, severe hurricanes passed over Lake Okeechobee. The poorly constructed
levees failed to withstand the wind tides which resulted in immense volumes of water being
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Flood Control District, now controls the entry of a major portion of the
Park's water supply.'" The only unrestricted natural flow remaining is
from the privately-owned, but undeveloped, Big Cypress Swamp.", The
jetport was located in the swamp about 36 miles west of Miami and six
miles north of the Park.'"
By 1968, operations at Miami International Airport had exceeded
its theoretical capacity.'1 Expansion of the airport was uneconomical
because it is surrounded almost completely by urban development.' 8
Since 35 to 42 percent of the total operations at Miami International
were training flights, construction of a 10,500-foot runway at the jetport
site was planned in order to relieve Miami International of these flights
and allow for expansion in the volume of commercial flights. 9
The Dade County Port Authority envisioned the training facility as
the first of three stages in the development of a major regional airport.20
The second stage would have provided for cargo handling.2" The full
swept into the Everglades farming area causing extensive damage. Over 2,300 residents in
areas adjacent to the lake were killed. As a result, the first federal water control programs
were initiated. In 1947, the year the Park was established, an unusually wet season and two
wet hurricanes combined once again to inundate the Everglades, fill Lake Okeechobee, and
cause sixty million dollars of damage. This flood led to the development of a comprehensive
plan for water control and to the creation of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Con-
trol District in 1948. NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDY, supra note 6, at 10-12; LEOPOLD REPORT,
supra note 2, at 59-64.
14. The Flood Control District releases water from Lake Okeechobee to the Park
through water conservation areas. The estimated minimum annual park requirement is
315,000 acre-feet. But the present regulation schedule fails to meet the Park's needs be-
cause a wide variation in annual releases has occurred and a minimum monthly flow
required to preserve its unique ecology has not been maintained. Interior Committee Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 24.
15. The Big Cypress Basin accounts for more than half of the surface water that flows
into the Park. LEOPOLD REPORT supra note 2, at 19. See also Robinson, Tortious Water Use
in the Big Cypress Swamp, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 690 (1971).
16. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 3.
17. H. LAMBERTON, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND THE DADE-COLLIER AIRPORT 1
(1969)) [hereinafter cited as LAMBERTON] (Lamberton is a partner in Howard, Needles,
Tammen & Bergendorff, the consulting firm of the Dade County Port Authority for plan-
ning the Everglades Jetport).
18. In contrast to the high land values near Miami International, the jetport site was ac-
quired from 2,400 owners for 3.4 million dollars, less than $150 per acre. Interior Com-
mittee Hearings, supra note 5 at 191. Land sales in the area immediately west of Miami Inter-
national in 1970-71 ranged from a low of $3,200 per acre to a high of $17,000 per acre.
Interview with Norman Arnold, Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff, in Miami, October
22, 1971.
19. DADE COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY, FISCAL YEAR 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1968).
Since 1968, the number of training flights has had to be diminished because of public ob-
jections to excessive nighttime noise, which forced the restriction of training flights to day-
light hours, and the higher priority of other types of traffic. The training facility was planned
to be operated on a 24-hour basis. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 93; LAM-
BERTON, supra note 17, at 1.
20. See DADE COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY, THE DADE-COLLIER AIRPORT STORY 7-10
(1969). During the initial training stage, no ground services other than those required in
emergency situations were planned, Id.
21. In 1968, Miami International handled about 169,000 tons of air cargo, and by
1980 the area's cargo tonnage is forecasted by the Port Authority to be about 745,000 tons.
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development of the jetport in the Big Cypress Swamp contemplated the
construction of an immense $200 million dollar complex"2 capable of
handling 50 million passengers annually. 3 Its land area, 39 square miles,
would have been larger than the combined land area of the four largest
airports in the United States. 4 In order to provide adequate transporta-
tion to the remote site, the development of a 1000-foot wide transpor-
tation corridor was planned. This corridor would have been capable of
handling tracked air cushion vehicles traveling at speeds of 150 to 250
miles per hour.25
The jetport would have served as the SST airport for the south-
eastern United States, providing service across the Atlantic and to other
parts of the world,2 and would have contributed significantly to Miami's
economy. One hundred thousand or more persons would have been em-
ployed at the jetport.27 Surrounding development alone would have added
an estimated $100 million dollars to the area's economy.25
While the public had a legitimate interest in the preservation of the
Everglades, it also had, on the other hand, a pressing need for improve-
ment of its transportation system. As urban areas push outward and as
Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 9. See A Dictionary of Miami Aviation Facts,
THE MIAMIAN 31 (Aug. 1970). The demand for air cargo operations at the new site would
introduce the first significant need for an improved ground access system connecting the
jetport with Metropolitan Miami and the West Coast of Florida. DADE COUNTY PORT
AUTHORITY, THE DADE-COLLIER AIRPORT STORY 9 (1969).
22. Interview with Robert F. Bacon, Chief, System Planning Division, Airports Service,
FAA, in Washington, D.C., April 15, 1971.
23. Id. Estimates of the jetport's size varied considerably during the jetport contro-
versy. For example, the Los Angeles Times carried an article on October 9, 1968 entitled
"Miami Goes to Swamp for Spacious Airport-Official Says Everglades Give Plenty of
Room 'Right into Time of Space Ships'" in which the Port Authority Director stated that
the jetport would have facilities to handle 150 million passengers yearly. Throughout the
planning of the jetport the Director frequently puffed up the size of the jetport while
much more realistic statements seem to have been made by the Deputy Director of the
Port Authority. The Director optimistically predicted in this article: "That five years from
now the hotels will be there. A large city will grow up around this jetport. We think it
will have aircraft manufacturing plants and even an air college." Interior Committee Hear-
ings, supra note 5, at 190-91.
24. DADE COUNTY PORT AUTHORITY, FISCAL 1968 ANmUAL REPORT 16 (1968). These air-
ports were San Francisco, Washington International, John F. Kennedy, and Los Angeles.
The jetport site is larger than the land area of the entire City of Miami.
25. On January 31, 1969, the Miami Herald carried an article entitled "Jetport to Get
Speedy Train" in which Florida Governor Claude Kirk announced that Miami was likely
to receive a demonstration grant eventually involving a $200 million dollar system. The
article stated that track air cushion vehicles would connect Miami with the planned jetport
in the Everglades. Miami Herald, January 31, 1969, at 1-C, col. 3. On March 16, 1969,
the Federal Railroad Administration announced the beginning of an engineering study
for this system by TRW Systems Group. TRW's final report was due on December 1, 1969.
Federal Railroad Administration News Release (March 16, 1969). In addition to the high
speed transit system, an extension of Interstate 75 south from Tampa to Naples on the
west coast and then east past the jetport site to Miami on the east coast was planned.
LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 2, at 49-51.
26. Miami Herald, March 21, 1968, at 23-A, col. 1.
27. LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 2, at 70.
28. Miami Herald, July 19, 1967, at 1-B, col 6.
1971]
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larger jets and jetports increasingly need to be located far from developed
areas, the likelihood of conflicts between transportation and environ-
mental interests grows.2" Possible environmental effects of the proposed
jetport upon the delicate ecological balance of the Everglades 0 consisted
of four broad categories: (1) noise pollution affecting both the surround-
ing wildlife and Park visitors; (2) water pollution resulting from sewage,
fuel dumps, spillages, and detergents; (3) air pollution from the exhaust
of aircraft landings and take-offs; and, (4) drainage which would result
in the diversion of water from its natural cycle of flow.8 The magnitude
of these possible effects would depend, of course, upon the nature of the
operations conducted at the jetport site. The development of the area
around the jetport would significantly intensify these problems. 2
III. THE LEGAL-REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The allocation of governmental responsibility established natural
sponsors for these competing environmental and transportation values.
The advancement of aviation was entrusted to the Dade County Port Au-
thority and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), while the in-
terests of the Everglades region were protected primarily by the Depart-
ment of Interior and the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control
District.
The Dade County Port Authority was established pursuant to the
"Port Authority Act, chapter 22963, Laws of Florida, 1945," which
permits counties with populations in excess of 260,000 to establish port
authorities with the power to operate numerous types of facilities, in-
cluding airports.8" The Dade County Commissioners are the Port Au-
thority, but a professional staff oversees the daily management of its
work. The responsibility of the Port Authority is extensive. In 1969 it
had assets of over 300 million dollars and supervisory control over five
airports.34
29. As stated by the Port Authority, every major hub area in the country needs to
expand its airport facilities and, in every case, available sites leave the possibility of harm-
ing either the environment or developed areas by noise pollution. DADE COUNTY PORT
AUTHORITY, THE DADE-COLLIER AIRPORT STORY 3 (1969).
30. A commercial jetport would produce considerable amounts of waste effluents from
associated human activities, detergent washdown of aircraft, and pesticide controls at the
jetport. When such effluents are released into lakes and swamps, the nutrients become
overabundant. As a result, less desirable planktonic algae increase in relation to the more
desirable epiphytic algae. This alteration of water quality and microflora, in turn, would
cause a change in the unique species composition of plants and animals in the Everglades.
LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
31. NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDY, supra note 6, at 23-47. The interruption of the natural
cycle of water flow would have a devastating effect on the ecology of the Everglades.
Periodic flooding allows surges in plant and animal life during the wet season and con-
centration of water-dependent life into more restricted pools as water disappears. A long-
term evolution of many species whose ways of life are uniquely adapted to the timing of
the water flow has consequently occurred. Id. at 21.
32. Id. at 23.




The involvement of the FAA in airport regulation takes two forms.
First, the FAA designates, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. section 1348, air space
within which aircraft operating under instrument landing conditions are
subject to the direction of control towers.3 5 These designations are made
"in order to insure the safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of
such air space."36 Second, the FAA grants funds under the Federal Aid
Airport Program (FAAP). 7 While the FAA does not license airports as
such, its regulatory authority over the use of air space gives it effective
control of airports since the operation of an airport would be impractical
if a designation of air space were refused. 8
There were two stages in the airport designation procedure during
the jetport controversy. The first was an informal non-rulemaking proce-
duce in which "interested parties" were notified of the pending designa-
tion and objections could be made to the area FAA office. Interested
parties were defined by the FAA as the aviation community. Notice was
given by mail rather than by publication. 9 The second stage was a formal
rulemaking procedure in which a notice of proposed rulemaking was
published in the Federal Register. Interested persons could submit ma-
terial to be included in the record for consideration by the decision
maker, meet informally with the FAA officials, or make presentations if
a public hearing were held."
It is unclear whether the FAA had the authority to refuse an air
space designation for reasons unrelated to safety and efficient utilization
of air space." The FAA during the jetport controversy took the position
35. 0. GRAY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1020 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as GRAY]. See 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970).
36. 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970).
37. Federal Aid Airport Program, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-19 (1970); Interview with Ray
Peach, Asst. Chief, Airports Service, Miami Area Office, FAA, in Miami, March 24, 1971.
Grants totaling $663,000 were made under FAAP for the jetport. Letter from Robert F.
Bacon, Chief, System Planning Division, Airports Service, FAA, March 21, 1969 (form
letter). The FAAP program has now been replaced by the Airport and Airway Develop-
ment Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-42 (1970).
38. Interview, supra note 22.
39. Interview with John Graffius, Chief, Air Traffic Control, Miami Area Office, FAA,
in Miami, April 16, 1971.
40. Interview with John Graffius, Chief, Air Traffic Control, Miami Area Office, FAA,
in Miami, March 25, 1971. See 14 C.F.R. § 151.65(a)-(d) (1971).
41. The argument has been made that the Department of Transportation Act of 1967,
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), as amended in 1968, requires the Federal Aviation Administration,
which has been in the Department of Transportation since April 11, 1967, to consider en-
vironmental questions in granting air space designations. The Act reads:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges and historic sites.
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). This section is commonly referred to as "4(f)" and continues:
[tihe Secretary shall not approve any program or project which requires use of any
publicly owned land from a public park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl
refuge of National, State, or local significance ... unless (1) there is no feasible and
prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all pos-
sible planning to minimize harm ...resulting from such use.
49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). It has been argued that overflights from the jetport at the
Everglades National Park and at Conservation Area No. 3 adjacent to the jetport constitute
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that it lacked such authority. 2 FAA regulations appear to support this
view." The FAA's discretion to consider environment factors is clearer
under the Federal Aid Airport Program. If federal funds are to be ex-
pended, the airport site and the development thereon must be approved
by the FAA. 4 Further, FAA regulations required that FAAP grants be
made only if a site is reasonably consistent with the existing plans of
public agencies for development of the area in which the airport is lo-
cated. Fair consideration must also have been given to the interests of
the communities in or near the project's location. 5 In practice, non-
safety criteria have been used in FAAP site approvals. 6
such a use of publicly owned land. Thus, a designation of air space could not be made
without the above quoted findings. See Opinion of B. Meyer, Associate Solicitor, Parks and
Recreation, to the Solicitor, Department of Interior, May 29, 1969 (reprinted in Interior
Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 129). However, there are two weaknesses in this
argument. First, it was not inevitable that overflights would occur (although they presently
are permitted under the Jetport Pact). Second, the concept that overflights constitute a use
of land, although finding some support in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962)
and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), is not a strong argument. An objection
to the designation of air space was filed with the FAA by the National Audubon Society
on the basis of 4(f), because no 4(f) finding had been made by the Secretary of Transporta-
tion as to the then pending designation. The FAA ruled that these objections were not
germane to the designation of air space. 35 Fed. Reg. 1220 (1970). The process of appeal
failed to reach Washington because the jetport controversy was settled politically first. See
generally Comment, Port Noise Complaint, 6 HARV. Cxri RIGHTs L. REv. 61 (1970); Note,
Wrongs and Rights in Superterraneous Airspace: Causby and the Courts, 9 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 460 (1967).
42. Interview with Ray Peach, Asst. Chief, Airports Service, Miami Area Office, FAA
in Miami, March 25, 1971.
43. 14 C.F.R. §§ 157.5 and 77.11 (1971). It is possible that § 101 of the National En-
vironment Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), may provide a legal basis for
refusing designations of air space where environmental harm would result from such an
airport.
44. Interview, supra note 42.
45. 14 C.F.R. § 151.39(a)(4) and (5) (1971). Since the passage of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act, FAA regulations have been promulgated requiring consideration of
environmental impact. FAA Order 5050.2. BOB Circular A-98 and the Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 now provide for airport master planning.
46. Interview, supra note 22. Although the FAAP Act details a procedure for objections
from the public to an airport and for hearings, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101-19 (1970), opponents
of the jetport did not make any objections prior to the grant. In the period before the
grant was made, the opponents were unorganized and did not have an attorney. They later
were represented by counsel who worked without compensation. Interview with Joe
Browder, Washington Director, Friends of the Earth, in Washington, D.C., April 14, 1971.
The fact that the environmentalists did not object at the earlier time is indicative of the
FAA's failure to encourage popular participation. In discussing a similar lack of encourage-
ment of active public participation in regard to the Federal Communication Commission,
one commentator has pointed out that:
In "rulemaking" proceedings, the public rarely learns of the proposals. Virtually all
the Commission does to notify the general public of its regulatory powers is to dis-
tribute "Public Notices" of its decisions and proposed rulemaking proceedings ...
The Commission then relies upon communications lawyers, the trade press, and the
Federal Register to bring the information to the public's attention. Thus, many
groups substantially affected by the Commission's decisions never learn of its pro-
posals, nor of the fact that they might participate.
Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 865, 880 (1971). See gen-
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The FAA functions as a decentralized organization. 47 The eight re-
gional offices, as well as the area offices reporting to them, direct field
operations within their geographic boundaries and have considerable
responsibility. Most project decisions, often involving millions of dollars,
are made at the local level, subject to approval at the regional level.48
This type of organization contrasts with that of the Department of In-
terior in which major decisions are made in Washington. Some have
pointed to this organizational difference as a reason for the failure of the
two involved federal agencies to come to terms with the jetport problem
at an early date. Correspondence at the time indicates a flow of reports
through the Interior bureaucracy from the field to regional and Washing-
ton officials who then dealt with high-ranking FAA officials. The FAA
officials in turn referred the matter back to local FAA officials. This
process did not keep up with the rapidly changing facts in the jetport
site search. It has also been stated that the local FAA officials assumed
that members of the National Park Service had equivalent authority.
In fact the Park representatives in meetings with the FAA were reluctant
to take any strong stand of opposition to the jetport because of a lack of
authority.
49
The protection of the interests of the Everglades National Park was
entrusted to the Department of the Interior. In the Act creating the Park,
a mandate was given to the National Park Service to maintain the Park's
wilderness state.50 The Department of Interior, however, was ill-equipped
to carry it out. While the FAA and the Dade County Port Authority had
the power to do great harm to the Park, the Department of Interior
lacked any regulatory power to protect it.
During the jetport controversy, the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and
Wildlife, the Geological Survey, the Federal Water Quality Administra-
tion, the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, and primarily the National Park
Service were involved on behalf of the Department of Interior. The
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation had been delegated by the Secretary of
Interior the overall responsibility of coordination with the Department
of Transportation under section 4(f) of the Department of Transporta-
eraUy Hanes, Citizen Participation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible Administra-
tive Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731 (1970).
47. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 381 (1971).
48. Interview with Washington FAA staff, in Washington, D.C., February 27, 1971.
49. Interview with Oscar Gray, former Acting Director of the Office of Environment
Impact, Department of Transportation, in Washington, D.C., April 22, 1971; Interview with
Manuel Morris, Chief, Division of Water Resources, Department of Interior, in Washington,
D.C., April 23, 1971.
50. Act of May 30, 1934, ch. 371, § 1, 48 Stat. 817, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1970). Congressional intent to preserve the natural character of the nation's National Parks
is stated in the act which created the National Park Service in 1916. The Park Service was
charged with conserving "the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife
therein and [with providing for] the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." Act of Aug.
25, 1916, ch. 408, § 1, 39 Stat. 535, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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tion Act of 1967, a responsibility that was in fact unfulfilled during the
jetport planning process.5 ' In carrying out this delegated authority, the
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was required to consult and coordinate
with the numerous Interior agencies and bureaus.52 Officials in the Na-
tional Park Service, however, were unaware of the Bureau of Outdoor
Recreation's delegated coordination role during the initial planning of the
jetport, even though this fact had been published in the Federal Reg-
ister.
58
Conservationists have criticized the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation
for its weak advocacy of the Park's interests after it did become involved
in the jetport controversy. 4 They have pointed out that the Bureau of
Outdoor Recreation, whose regional office was located in Atlanta, lacked
both an immediate understanding of the problems of the National Park
Service and a vested interest in the Park comparable to that of the Na-
tional Park Service." Furthermore, through the administration of finan-
cial assistance to the states under the Land and Water Conservation
Fund Act of 1965,6 the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, according to
both conservationists and National Park Service officials, has developed
a strong tendency toward accommodation when dealing with state govern-
mental units.
57
The National Park Service itself has traditionally kept a "low
profile" in respect to the community surrounding a national park or
forest and has generally avoided political involvement.5" Its approach has
been one of caution, always questioning its authority to act and refrain-
ing from objecting outside its jurisdiction, unless statutory authority for
objecting existed. 9 However, because of the awakening of the nation to
51. 32 Fed. Reg. 15066 (1967). For an explanation of the coordination requirements
of § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1967, see note 41 supra.
52. 32 Fed. Reg. 15066 (1967). The Bureau of Outdoor Recreation was created on
April 2, 1962, and has the responsibility for promoting coordination and development of
effective programs relating to outdoor recreation. In performing these responsibilities, the
Bureau reports to the Secretary of Interior through the Assistant Secretary for Public Land
Management. The Bureau has no active management responsibilities itself. U.S. DEPT. OF
INTERIOR, AMERICA'S DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 26-27 (1969).
53. Interview with Manuel Morris, Chief, Division of Water Resources, in Washington,
D.C., February 23, 1971.
54. Interview with Joe Browder, Washington Director, Friends of the Earth, in Wash-
ington, D.C., February 22, 1971.
55. Id. For example, after a field trip to Florida in the fail of 1968, L.G. Henricksen,
Recreation Realty Coordinator for the Atlanta Office of the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,
stated:
The conservation and other allied interests must bear in mind that the jetport will
become a reality. Since this is a fact of life, reason dictates that much negotiation
must result in order to achieve the best position possible.
Memorandum from L.G. Henricksen to Assistant Regional Director Durand, Atlanta Office,
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, October 15, 1968.
56. 16 U.S.C. §§ 460k-4 to 460---11 (1970).
57. Interview, supra note 53 and note 54.




environmental issues, the National Park Service is presently becoming
more militant in defending its interests. 0
A state entity, the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control
District, is indirectly involved in the protection of Everglades National
Park's interests. It operates three water-conservation areas in South
Florida, one of which is located directly east of the jetport site.6 1 The
Flood Control District is empowered by state statute to grant permits
for release of water into the Flood Control District and manages the re-
lease of water from the District into the Park. 2 It has demonstrated a
strong resistance to development of any kind within its water conservation
areas.
6 3
It should be remembered that government agencies do not func-
tion in a vacuum, but, rather, in a larger context of particular publics
who are interested in their activities and share common interests. In the
case of the Port Authority and the FAA, the public was the airlines and
the business community of Miami; in the case of the National Park
Service the public was the conservationists.6 4 Throughout the period of
jetport planning and development, these private interests took part in
the decisionmaking process and were to critically affect the project's
outcome.
IV. PLANNING THE JETPORT
The Port Authority foresaw and sought ways to relieve the growing
demand on Miami International as early as 1952." For ten years follow-
ing 1957, a far-ranging site study was conducted.6 Early in 1966, a con-
sideration of sites in the Everglades region began.6 7
60. Interview, supra note 54.
61. GRAY, supra note 35, at 1008.
62. FLA. STAT. §§ 378.01(3), 378.16(2), 378.17(1)-(2) (1969).
63. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 67.
64. This so-called "subgovernment phenomenon" grows around any specialized private
interest-government relationship. In a recent article, Nicholas Johnson has pointed out that:
policymaking by agencies is dominated by . . . a coalescence of lobbyists, specialty
lawyers, trade associations, trade press, congressional subcommittee staff members
and . . . personnel who cluster around each of the regulated industries . . . . The
problem likely does not involve sinister collaboration to undermine the effectiveness
of regulatory control, but is instead much more subtle. It causes an industry orienta-
tion on the part of many and honest agency members, as well as agency staffs.
Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 865 (1971).
65. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 2.
66. B. SEEPARD, A JETPORT REPORT: SoisE FACTS TO FACE 2-3 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as SHEPAR]. In 1957, the Dade County Port Authority initiated a study of site possibilities
for an airport to relieve Miami International Airport of training flights. The two year study
recommended "that planning be continued for a major future airfield, either in the bay area
south of Biscayne Key, or in the Everglades, to provide for training and future scheduled
flights as the need arises." LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 3. This recommendation is significant
in two respects. It shows that nine years before the construction of the Everglades Jetport,
the Port Authority was considering a commercial airport in the Everglades as well as a
training facility. Not until very late in the planning process was there any consideration of
the environmental effects that either a training or commercial operation would have on the
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Throughout this period the decision making proceeded ex parte be-
tween the Port Authority, FAA and the airlines. Factors considered in
the site selection included existing air traffic demands, community noise
impact, cost of land, political feasibility and economic benefit to Miami.
Although the press covered the site search, there was no procedure by
which the public or other governmental agencies could participate at this
stage.
Early in 1967, the six principal Miami airlines proposed a site 23
miles west of Miami International Airport in Conservation Area No. 3
of the Flood Control District."' Consideration of this site terminated
when the Port Authority could not reach an agreement with Broward
County, into which the jetport would have extended.09 The Chairman of
the Flood Control District had also requested that this site not be used.7"
This site brought the first manifestation of concern from the Everglades
National Park. Reacting to newspaper reports, the Park Superintendent
sent a memorandum to the Regional Director of the Park Service, stating
that his primary concerns were noise and low-flying aircraft.71 The fol-
lowing month the Park Superintendent wrote the Director of the Dade
County Port Authority expressing the same concerns. That letter was
never answered. 2
By April 1967, the Port Authority's attention had shifted to several
sites in Monroe County, west of Dade County.7 3 The Park Superinten-
dent, by chance, attended a social function at which a Dade County
Commissioner was also present and learned that within a day or two the
Monroe County Commissioners would vote on approval of a site adjoin-
ing the Park. The next day the Park Superintendent called the Director
of the Port Authority and arranged a meeting. At that meeting, the
Director produced a map showing a number of possible locations. The
reaction of the Park representatives was that the farther away the air-
port would be from the Park the better. After the meeting, the Superin-
tendent wired the Monroe Commissioners asking them to delay a decision
because of possible harm to the Park.74 In addition, the Superintendent
Park. Throughout the period of the site studies, the Port Authority conferred with the
Federal Aviation Administration, the Air Transport Association (the trade association of
the airlines), and the airlines themselves, but not with any agencies concerned with the
Everglades or environmental interests.
67. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 3. In addition to one located in the Bahamas, seven
other sites located throughout Florida were rejected for various reasons. Some had limited
air space capacity and were in areas of already heavy air traffic. Some were too close to
residential areas and others were located too far from Miami to be feasible. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 6.
69. Interview, supra note 54.
70. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 6.
71. Letter from Roger Allin, Superintendent, Everglades National Park, to the Regional
Director, Southeast Region, National Park Service, February 9, 1967.
72. Interview, supra note 53.
73. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 6.
74. Interview, supra note 53.
[Vol. XXV
COMMENTS
sent a letter to the Port Authority Director urging consideration of
Homestead Air Force Base and a site in Collier County. The Superinten-
dent stated that, while the problem of industrial and domestic pollution
that comes with a facility of the kind proposed could possibly be objec-
tionable to the Park, "our principal concern is the intrusion and noise of
low-flying aircraft and of the resulting disturbance to Park visitors and
wildlife. . . ."' The Park Superintendent did not perceive at this point
the issues of water pollution or of surrounding development which were
later to become crucial.
At about this time negotiations with the Monroe County Commis-
sioners failed and the Port Authority shifted its attention to Collier
County, northwest of Dade County.70 Collier County has some develop-
ment on its Gulf shore, but inland it is mostly underdeveloped swamp-
land. An agreement was eventually reached through the mediation of
the Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce.
78
A short time after the Port Authority began looking at the Collier
County sites, the Regional Director of the National Park Service (South-
east Region, Richmond, Va.), in a letter to the FAA's Atlanta Regional
Office, expressed concern about one of the Monroe sites. In response to
his request for additional information, the Regional Director was advised
that consideration of this site had been deferred in favor of a site near
the one suggested in the Park Superintendent's letter. 79 The acting Re-
gional Director of the Park Service replied:
75. The Superintendent's letter also stated:
We again urge that consideration be given to locating such a facility away from the
National Park as requested in our letter of March 21. . . .The spector of SST
operations capability in the very near future which might make this a major regional
airport with a further increase in overflights is even more alarming to us ...
We suggest that further exploration of the feasibility of the location several
miles north in Collier County about T52 R33 be undertaken. . . . We further request
a more thorough examination of aircraft effects upon other resource uses. May we
suggest there may be a need for public hearings before a contract for construction
is let.
Letter from Roger Allin, Superintendent, Everglades National Park, to Allan Stewart, Di-
rector, Dade County Port Authority, May 2, 1967.
This letter became a focal point of later debate, with Jetport supporters claiming it was
a Park recommendation of the jetport site which was located near the one mentioned in the
letter. A more accurate statement would be that consideration of the site was suggested.
76. Miami Herald, July 19, 1967, at 1-B, col. 6. Monroe County had wanted to trade
an airport site for Dade County's offshore island city of Islandia.
77. National Academy Study, supra note 6, at 60.
78. Interview, supra note 54. In this interview, Joe Browder stated that he, acting in
the capacity of Vice President of the local National Audubon Society, talked to the Port
Authority Director about the Collier sites. The Director reacted with a hostile and indifferent
attitude. The Deputy Director, however, convinced him that conservation considerations
would be taken into account step by step through the planning process and that the Park
would be protected. The Deputy Director also stated that he had investigated the problems
of the Flood Control District with the Park and didn't want to get bogged down as it had.
79. Letter from the Regional Director, National Park Service, to FAA Atlanta Regional
Office, May 31, 1967; Letter from J.D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and
Environment, Department of Transportation, to Senator Henry M. Jackson, June 27, 1969,
in the Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39.
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advice that an alternative site in the vicinity of [the Superin-
tendent's suggested site] is under advisement is very heartening
to us. We sincerely appreciate the consideration being given to
the Park in this regard. 0
Throughout this period, the Port Authority effectively excluded the
Department of Interior from the site selection process by giving it little
information. Departmental correspondence, which did not keep pace
as the airport site jumped from one location to another, points up In-
terior's isolation. Despite later claims of coordination with the Park, it
appears that the Park was forced to rely on newspaper reports of sites
being considered. The actual selection was apparently based on technical,
economic, and political considerations (including the Port Authority's
ability to reach an agreement with another county), having little to do
with the Park's wishes.
In November 1967, the Dade County Port Authority selected the
final site. It was located north of the Tamiami Trail about thirty-six
miles west of Miami and six miles north of the Everglades National
Park, straddling the Dade-Collier boundary, with two-thirds of it in
Collier County.81 In reply to an inquiry from the Director of the National
Park Service, the acting Director of the FAA stated that:
[I]n conjunction with our review of [a request for federal aid]
and prior to its approval we will consult the National Park
Service officials at the local level .... We understand such con-
sultation has already taken place between the Port Authority
and the Park Superintendent.
8 2
In February 1968, the Port Authority made an application to the
FAA which requested that the training airport be included in the Na-
tional Airports Plan and that a grant be given them under the Federal
Aid Airport Program (FAAP).3 After concluding its own site selection
process which resulted in the Everglades Jetport Site, the Port Authority
began a process of consultation. It was later to point to this process as
evidence that it had consulted various conservation agencies and had
obtained their approval of the site.84 A Port Authority consultant wrote
of the process:
[I] t is difficult to see, how any public agency, not having the
wisdom of hindsight, could be expected to have done more to
establish its legal and civic right to proceed with a project.85
80. Letter from Acting Regional Director of the National Park Service to the FAA
Atlanta Regional Office, June 8, 1967, in Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39.
81. LAM ERTON, supra note 17, at 6.
82. Letter from D.D. Thomas, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration,
to H.L. Bill, Acting Director, National Park Service, December 20, 1967.
83. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 6.
84. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 96 (Statement of William W. Gibbs,
General Counsel, Dade County Port Authority).
85. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 9.
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In February 1968, the Deputy Director of the Port Authority met
with the heads of the Florida Board of Conservation, the Florida Game
and Fresh Water Fish Commission and the Central and Southern Florida
Flood Control District. He informed them of the Port Authority's plans
for construction of the training airport and requested their approval.8
The replies of the heads of these various agencies expressed no objec-
tion. However, since the agencies were not fully advised of possible
further development into a commercial airport,8 their evaluations were
restricted to a training airport with limited support facilities. In the
opinion of one state official, "the Port Authority brilliantly piecemealed
us [by obtaining comments from each state agency separately] .... We
had no idea of the size of the project or of their time frame."8' 9
The Port Authority, through its consulting engineers, then conducted
a series of meetings with representatives of the National Park Service,
the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District, and the state
conservation agencies to discuss such matters as runway alignment,
flight patterns, the danger of bird strikes, and water runoff from the
airport.90 According to one participant, the meetings were informal and
86. This consultation was required by the Federal Aid Airport Program. See 14 C.F.R.
§ 151.39(a) (2), (4), and (5) (1971).
87. See, e.g., Letter from Randolph Hodges, Director, Florida Board of Conservation to
the Director of the Dade County Port Authority, February 21, 1968. This letter stated:
My staff and I have reviewed this site in regard to the jurisdictional areas for which
this agency is responsible and it has been determined that the proposed site is accep-
table and meets the conservation standards of our department.
88. Interview, supra note 54; See, e.g., Letter from Game and Fresh Water Fish Com-
mission to the Director, Dade County Port Authority, March 6, 1968, which stated:
This is particularly true based on the facts presented to us wherein only a small
portion [of the 39 miles] would be used for the construction of two runways while
the major portion would be left in its native state. . . .One concern we did have
related to the possibility of Conservation Area 3 becoming contaminated by fuel
discharges from departing jets, but I understand you have already informed one of
our representatives that there is no problem here.
Later commenting on this process, an official of the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish
Commission wrote:
We were first told that the area would be used as a jet training facility to relieve
pressure from the Miami International Airport. The next thing we knew they were
proposing to move all of Miami International to the Big Cypress and construct 6
mile long runways to accomodate the new SST jets. They also released plans for six
launching pads for future inter-planetary commercial traffic. Before any of the com-
ments could be worked up by our agency ...they began construction on the one
existing runway.
Letter from the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission to David C. Brenan,
U. FrA. L. REV., November 19, 1969.
89. Interview with Nathaniel Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior, in Washington,
D.C., May 19, 1971.
90. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 96. The first consultation on March
27, 1968, was a tour of the site by an engineering technician from the Everglades Park and
a wildlife biologist from the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife of the Department of
Interior. It was later argued that "[elach gentleman gave the impression that the site was
suitable to Park authorities, with each offering his future services for ensuring the airport's
environmental compatibility." Letter from J.D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Urban
Systems and Environment, Department of Transportation, to Senator Henry M. Jackson,
June 27, 1969, reprinted in the Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39. The Park's
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their purpose was to inform the Port Authority's engineering consul-
tants of the environmental problems facing the jetport.91 Park repre-
sentatives raised the problems of noise, water supply and quality, and
harm to wildlife from planes striking bird flocks and other wildlife. The
engineers were unable to solve some of the problems. 2 For example,
even tertiary treatment of the water runoff would leave phosphate and
nitrate residues. These residues would cause water in the Park to become
overrich, thus changing the type of algae in the water and upsetting the
food chain.9 3 While the meetings progressed, preparations for acquiring
the site and starting construction went forward.
94
Some have since questioned why the Park representatives did not
take a stronger position of opposition to the jetport at this time.95 James
D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and Environment in
the Department of Transportation, later argued that prior to approval of
the grant, almost two years of "periodic coordination ... had transpired
without producing a positive position opposing the airport's construc-
tion."9 Rather, the FAA "possessed the distinct impression that a train-
observer was neither a trained ecologist nor a biologist. The other observer prepared a report
limited to effects on game animals and did not consider other possible damage. The purpose
of the trip was merely fact-finding. Interview, supra note 53.
In April 1968, a meeting was held to review three preliminary master plans for the
airport and to discuss the impact of alternative flight patterns over the Park. The Park's
representative stated that the Park could coexist with a single runway airport aligned east-
west. He further stated that the plans for removal of water southward were acceptable but
that pollution must be avoided. The Park's representative was a ranger-pilot and had no
training as a biologist. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39; Interview, supra
note 53.
On June 12, 1968, another meeting was held to discuss drainage from the airport. Two
Park representatives, including one biologist, were present. They stated that the Park would
like to have all of the jetport's water runoff. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39.
A memorandum from a Park representative indicates the discussion was limited to design of
drainage facilities associated with the training and transition airport. Memorandum from
Ranger-pilot Ralph Miele to Superintendent, Everglades National Park, June 17, 1968. The
total ecology of the area was the subject of a meeting on June 20, 1968. Interior Committee
Hearings, supra note 5, at 39. This time the Park's delegation included three scientists. The
discussion at the meeting, however, centered on operational details such as whether trees on
the site should be topped or removed and what kind of fence would be needed to keep
animals off the runway. Memorandum from William Robertson, Research Biologist, National
Park Service, to the Superintendent, Everglades National Park, June 24, 1968.
91. Interview with Ralph Miele, Ranger-pilot, National Park Service, in Miami, July
27, 1971.
92. Id.
93. See notes 30 and 31 supra.
94. See notes 99 and 100 infra and accompanying text.
95. Interview with Oscar Gray, former Acting Director of the Office of Environmental
Impact, Department of Transportation, in Washington, D.C., February 25, 1971.
96. Letter from J.D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and Environment,
Department of Transportation, to Senator Henry M. Jackson, June 27, 1969 (reprinted in
the Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39); Cf. Memorandum from William
Robertson, Research Biologist, National Park Service, to Superintendent, Everglades National
Park, June 24, 1968, in which one of the Park representatives wrote:
I felt that the engineering representatives weren't willing to say much except about
the initial development, two training runways with minimum support facilities. ....
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ing and transition airport at the selected site . . . could . . ..coexist with
the Park's environment.19 7 One Interior official explained the Park Ser-
vice's reluctance to object strongly to the jetport during this period:
the Park Service had a habit common to government bureacracy, of
narrowly interpreting its own authority to act. Where, as in the case of
the jetport, it had no legal power to stop a project, the Park Service
believed it had no right to actively object to it. The jetport was being
built outside the Park boundaries on another agency's property. The
most the Park Service thought it could do was to quietly seek an ac-
commodation.9
V. ORIGIN OF PUBLIC OPPOSITION
During July and August of 1968, condemnation proceedings were
initiated for the Dade-Collier tract.09 On September 18, 1968, the Port
Authority broke ground at the site. 00 In early November 1968, the first
public criticism occurred. 10' Ironically, it was not directed at the jetport
itself, but, rather, at the location of Interstate 75, which was being con-
sidered as the access route to the jetport. On October 31, 1968, the
How the jetport area and its environs develop is likely to be vitally important to
the Park, but in my opinion the operation at the above level of detail is no proper
concern of ours. . . . I think we need a thorough discussion of the entire project
with lead time enough to have some chance to redirect plans that could damage the
Park. . . . I must confess as well that the thought crossed my mind that this may
have been a meeting for meeting's sake. Something to point to in case of later
criticism.
But if any of the concerns in this memorandum were raised at the meeting, they were not
reflected in the minutes prepared by the Port Authority's consulting firm. See Memorandum
from V.J. Knezevich of Howard, Needles, Tamman & Bergendoff to the File, June .20,
1968 (minutes).
97. Letter from J.D. Braman, Assistant Secretary for Urban Systems and Environment,
Department of Transportation, to Senator Henry M. Jackson, June 27, 1969 (reprinted in
the Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39). The lack of machinery 'to identify
significant environmental issues utilized in the planning of the jetport directly influenced the
development of Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Interview,
supra note 95. Section 102 requires all agencies of the Federal Government, when making
recommendations or reports on proposals for legislation or other major federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment, to include a detailed, inter-
disciplinary statement on 1) the environmental impact of the proposed action; 2) any
alternatives; and 3) comments of appropriate federal agencies. Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) and (B), (1970).
98. Interview, supra note 53. The Port Authority, on the other hand, may have gen-
uinely desired to avoid harm to the Everglades. However, it does not seem that this willing-
ness included the possibility of abandoning the site that had been so painstakingly selected.
It may well be that the Port Authority did not understand the complex and delicate eco-
system into which it was placing its airport. It also seems that Port Authority officials had a
limited concept of environmental protection. When they said "conservation," one observer
noted, they were thinking of game, fish and animals, not whole systems of which man is a
part. Interview, supra note 95.
99. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 94.
100. Governor Kirk at the ceremony saluted "this tremendous accomplishment" and
urged "all citizens to take commensurate pride in this undertaking that will prove to be the
first supersonic jetport in the entire world." SHEPAR , supra note 66, at 5.
101. Letter from Robert Padrick to Richard Judy, November 5, 1968.
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Chairman of the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District,
Robert Padrick, who had previously concurred in the jetport site, at-
tended a meeting at the State Road Department in Fort Lauderdale,
where he was confronted with "a plan which would route a limited access
highway through the middle of the airport property and thence eastward
through our Conservation Area ... thereby doing precisely that to which
we are most opposed."' 12 On November 5, 1968, Padrick sent letters to
more than one hundred "conservation-minded" citizens, requesting their
support to defeat this "abominable proposal.'
03
The Port Authority promptly issued assurances that it would neither
sponsor nor promote any transportation corridor which did not meet with
the approval of the Flood Control District and others concerned with
conservation. The Deputy Director of the Port Authority, in a letter to
Padrick, stated that the Authority was not responsible for the proposed
location." 4 But in a reply to one of Padrick's protest letters, the Commis-
sioner of the State Road Department stated that the meeting in Fort
Lauderdale was the first time the State Road Department had been con-
sulted to "review alignments proposed by the Port Authority."10 5 These
contrasting versions of responsibility for the proposed route of the inter-
state highway cast doubt upon the Port Authority's credibility and served
as an impetus for the organization of conservation interests.'0
On December 13, 1968, representatives of the Flood Control District,
102. Miami Herald, November 12, 1968, at 2-B, col. 1.
103. Letter from Robert Padrick to conservationists, November 5, 1968, in the Interior
Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 87-88.
104. Letter from Richard Judy to Robert Padrick, November 8, 1968; See also Miami
News November 22, 1968, at 10-A, col. 3, which states:
The Dade County Port Authority wants it known that conservationists are
among its favorite people.
. : : [Tihe Port Authority's deputy director sent us a volume of material
which demonstrated that the Authority has been clearing its moves with the FCD,
the Everglades National Park and other conservation-minded agencies for many
months.
Judy, who is as diplomatic as he is efficient, made it clear that he simply wants
to clarify the issue ....
Padrick's concern is understandable, [the deputy director] said, since 'the history
of government only tells the story of neglect for conservation in the construction
of the public projects.'
But that's history, Judy said. The Port Authority's commitment to conservation
is a matter of record.
105. Letter from Jay Brown, Commissioner of State Road Department, to Robert
Padrick, November 13, 1968.
106. Interview, supra note 54. In a later letter to Jay Brown, dated December 12, 1968,
the Deputy Director explained that Jay Brown had been invited to attend a meeting in
Miami on March 28, 1968, at which time the transportation corridor concept had been in-
troduced. Brown had been unable to attend the meeting, but the Port Authority had in-
formed the State Road Department staff of its plans. The map used by Judy at the Fort
Lauderdale meeting had been based, according to Judy, upon an earlier map prepared by
the State Road Department showing Interstate 75 passing through the jetport site. Judy's
map also showed an alternate location following U.S. 41, known locally as the Tamiami
Trail.
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the State of Florida, the Department of Interior, the Corps of Engineers
and conservation organizations met to discuss the jetport situation.
Padrick indicated that the Flood Control District was no longer fearful
of a direct invasion by the airport or the highway. However, Chairman
Padrick was still concerned about the effect on water quality and quan-
tity likely to result from the jetport's development and consequent res-
idential, commercial and industrial development. His concern was echoed
by others present. 07 The group agreed that they should insist upon a
comprehensive study of the socio-environmental problems posed by the
jetport, including alternatives and a plan for minimizing impacts.108
On February 28, 1969, the Port Authority held a public meeting to
answer 119 questions prepared by these state and federal agencies and
conservation representatives. 09 These questions concerned the jetport's
planning; development and operation; drainage, water supply and water
quality; water, air and noise pollution; wildlife and recreation; regional
comprehensive planning; surface transportation and waste disposal." 0
Over 200 persons, including interested citizens, attended this meeting.
The Port Authority presented prepared answers which were often general
in nature, providing little concrete or useful information."' The discus-
sion at the meeting centered upon the fact that little or no planning had
been done or was being done either to determine the impact of the jetport
on the environment, or to provide for orderly development of the area
surrounding the jetport. 12 The state and federal representatives, as well
as the conservationists, were generally dissatisfied with the Port Au-
thority's response."' The Eastern Representative of the Sierra Club,
Gary Soucie, warned ominously that conservation organizations would
107. Memorandum from Roger Pegues, Staff Assistant, National Park Service, Washing-
ton Office, to the Everglades Task Force, December 20, 1968.
108. Id. At this meeting a "minor split" occurred between those who felt that the jetport
was probably inevitable so that the group should limit its efforts to mitigating the damages
and those who felt that the group could block or move the jetport.
109. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 69. The Southeast Regional Bureau
of Outdoor Recreation collected and prepared the final set of study problems and questions
which were turned over to Padrick, who, in turn, officially transmitted them to the Port
Authority late in January 1969. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 11. In order to "force the
Authority into meaningful discussion and pave the way for the study and planning pro-
gram," the Flood Control District had informed the Port Authority that plans for the
jetport which included drainage and/or withdrawal of water in association with the works
of the District would be subject to the District's approval. Letter from Robert Padrick to
Chuck Hall, Mayor, Metropolitan Dade County, December 24, 1968.
110. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 69-79.
111. LAMBERrON, supra note 17, at 11-12. The crowd at this meeting seemed to be
divided between friends of the conservationists and friends of the Chamber of Commerce.
Interview, supra note 54. Numerous questions were answered by the phrases "study in
progress," "currently under study," or "the problem is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Authority."
112. See Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 70-79.
113. Memo, Meeting Concerning Planning to Preserve Environment in Areas Affected
by the Proposed-Southern Florida Jetport, Miami Springs, Florida, February 28, 1969.
Interview, supra note 54.
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respond unfavorably to the answers given at the meeting. He predicted
that the airport would not be finished because of the intense campaign
that would be waged against it unless adequate study and restraints for
the protection of the Everglades National Park were undertaken." 4
Two major institutional decisions resulted from this meeting. First,
the Department of Interior proposed that an inter-agency, inter-govern-
mental committee be established to represent all those concerned with
the possible environmental effects of the jetport." 5 Second, it was decided
that steps should be taken to establish a regional unit to supervise de-
velopment of the jetport and the surrounding area." 0 During the spring
of 1969, these proposals were put into effect.117 The inter-agency, inter-
governmental committee was formed to define studies that were needed
and to function in an advisory capacity to the regional planning coun-
sel." These arrangements, however, failed to achieve a solution and
were superseded by the organization of the private conservation groups
which placed the issue into the national political arena.
VI. THE JETPORT BECOMES A NATIONAL ISSUE
The local conservationists who represented various private conserva-
tion organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the National Audubon
Society, developed a mistrust of the Port Authority after the inconsistent
response to Padrick's protest letters by the Port Authority and the State
Road Department."' The Port Authority's credibility was questioned
even more after the public meeting on February 28, 1969, which the
conservationists interpreted as showing a lack of environmental planning
on the part of the Port Authority. The apparent lack of environmental
planning alarmed many conservationists because it appeared that the
114. Id.
115. Summary, Jetport Meeting, February 28, 1969.
116. Memorandum from Gary Radtke, U.S. Public Health Service, Consultant to the
National Park Service, to the National Park Service, February 28, 1969.
117. As a result of this meeting, the State Planning Director arranged and chaired
meetings between Dade, Collier and Monroe Counties (the three counties surrounding the
jetport site) to discuss the feasibility of a regional planning council. It was determined that
a regional planning council could be organized under Florida law which authorizes two or
more counties and municipalities to create regional planning councils, composed of two
representatives appointed by each county commission and municipal body desiring represen-
tation. See FLA. STAT. §§ 160.01, 160.02 (1969). Further representation is established ac-
cording to the population within the boundaries of the government unit. FLA. STAT. §
160.01(1) (1969). Regional councils are empowered to advise and to cooperate with local
government units, to expend funds for study and planning, and to hold public meetings and
forums where helpful. Their powers are strictly advisory to the counties. FLA. STAT. §
160.02 (1969).
118. On April 30, 1969, a meeting was held at which seven main items of study were
considered and six study committees were established. The Department of Interior had
representation on all of these committees. Deputy Director of the Dade County Port Au-
thority Richard Judy was to be the Chairman of the committee studying the environmental
control of the area. Letter from J. M. Frazier, Acting Miami Area Manager, FAA, to Senator
William B. Saxbe, May 6, 1969.
119. Interview, supra note 54.
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Port Authority Was rapidly proceeding toward construction of a commer-
cial airport at the training airport site. 20
The local conservation representatives alerted their national organi-
zations early in 1969.121 They also turned to the news media.1 -2 Through-
out the controversy, the media were supplied with provocative news items
aimed at mobilizing widespread public support. 23 This move was to prove
to be the decisive factor in the jetport controversy.
At first, the Port Authority laughed the conservationists off as
"butterfly chasers."'1 24 In an interview, the Deputy Director stated, "re-
gardless of what the environmental plan might dictate, however, '[w] e're
going to build the jetport .... 1 "12' He also predicted that "the forces
that come to play will destroy the conservationists."' 2 6 On April 14, 1969,
the Port Authority Director predicted a new city was bound to rise up
around the jetport site despite any efforts to stop it.'
2 7
Representatives of the National Parks Association, National Au-
dubon Society, Wilderness Society, Nature Conservancy, Wildlife Man-
agement Institute, Sierra Club and Citizens Committee on Natural Re-
sources met in Washington during April 1969, and organized a united
120. See, e.g., note 25 supra.
121. Interview with Judy Wilson, Local Representative, National Audubon Society, in
Miami, February 5, 1971.
122. Interview, supra note 54.
123. On January 11, 1969, the New York Times carried the first of numerous articles
to appear in the next year, a special feature headline, "The Everglades: Will Man Turn a
Refuge into a Wasteland?" and an accompanying article which was sharply critical of the
jetport. The January 19 Washington Star carried a special article entitled "Massive Airport
Invading Florida's 'Glades.'" LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 10. The January 1969 issue of
the National Parks Magazine carried a very critical article which began the conservationists'
appeal for political pressure on the part of the general public. The article suggested that
interested readers write then President-elect Nixon "if you think that nonsense like the giant
jetport in the Everglades should stop. . . ." This article was couched in emotional terms
with the apparent intent of arousing public indignation. It stated:
One of the latest in the passing parade of environmental follies . . . is the new
jetport ... [it] starts out as a training field; its future, in the eyes of its promoters,
is to be the biggest transcontinental and international jetport, perhaps, in the world.
.. Having invested vast efforts and millions of dollars on a famous national park, we
now turn our engineering powers against our own environmental treasures ...
The Conservation Areas established to store water for myriad social and ecological
purposes will now begin to fill with rock, sand and gravel.
Folly in Florida, 43 NATIONAL PARKS MAGAZINE 2 (January 1969).
124. Interview, supra note 121.
125. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 180.
126. Id.
127. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 179. These statements and the
issuance of reports on the position of the Dade County Port Authority, especially The Dade-
Collier Airport Story: Update 1, eventually led to the Port Authority's passing a resolution
warning its staff about its actions. On October 23, 1969, the Miami Herald carried the
following story:
The Metro Commission vowed Wednesday to gag the Port Authority staff, if neces-
sary, to keep them from issuing any more statements on the proposed Everglades
Jetport without commission approval. . . . 'There are indications that the admini-
strative staff. at times thinks the Port Authority is unnecessary,' agreed Mayor
Chuck Hall.
Miami Herald, Oct. 23, 1969, B-I, col. 8.
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campaign. 28 By the end of April, the "Everglades Coalition" consisted
of nineteen national conservation societies and had already acted on the
federal level to protest the jetport. 29 On April 17, 1969, the Coalition
sent a joint letter to the Secretary of Transportation, John Volpe, which
requested the Secretary act to protect the Park. Further, the letter warned
that: "[the Coalition] publish[es] a number of powerful monthly maga-
zines . ..which will be devoted constantly toward public education on
this issue until the matter is resolved favorably to environmental pro-
tection."'3 0 The Coalition also made private contacts within the Interior
Department and the Congress. 3' Addressing the National Audubon So-
ciety Annual Convention on April 26, 1969, Senator Henry M. Jackson,
Chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, an-
nounced that the Senate Interior Committee would conduct hearings in
early June on the jetport problem.132 As the controversy developed, a
behind-the-scenes alliance between the conservationists and concerned
civil servants came about. This alliance consisted primarily of an ex-
change of information and internal lobbying.
133
Reacting to the growing strength of the conservationists, the
Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce issued a statement which de-
scribed the efforts of national conservation groups to stop development
of the jetport as "limited in vision" and based on "incomplete Jnforma-
tion.' 31 34 It stated that the community cannot stand idly by and let groups
not directly involved bring national pressure on the Department of Trans-
portation to kill a project that is of paramount importance to the economy
of South Florida. 8 On May 14, 1969, the Port Authority passed a resolu-
tion stating that the Everglades Jetport site would be used only for a
128. Interview, supra note 54.
129. Id.
130. Letter from the Everglades Coalition to the Secretary of Transportation, John A.
Volpe, April 17, 1969.
131. Interview, supra note 54. For a good discussion of the methods used by the con-
servationists, see generally Heard, Washington Pressures-Friends of the Earth Give Environ-
mental Interests An Activist Voice, 32 NATIONAL JOURNAL 1711 (1970).
132. Address by Senator Henry M. Jackson, National Audubon Society Annual Con-
vention, April 26, 1969.
133. For example, Interior officials persuaded the Solicitor's Office to release a memoran-
dum a few days before the Interior Committee Hearings which gave the opinion that Section
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act applied to the jetport designation of air-
space. In fact, much of the legal research that went into the document came not from the
Solicitor's Office, but from concerned civil servants in the Park Service. It is understood
that this blurring of the lines between lobbyists and public officials is common to all gov-
ernment agencies. Interview, supra note 53. Also, the conservationists helped prepare the
Senate Interior Committee for its hearings. This included a chronological history of the
project as well as arguments against it. It is understood that there is a great deal of lobbyist
activity involved in Congressional hearings .which is not reflected in the record. Often ques-
tions asked by Congressmen have been supplied by lobbyists or by interested government
officials. Interview, supra note 54.
134. Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce, Press Release (April 25, 1969).
135. Id.
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training facility and that an environmental plan would have to be de-
veloped before the jetport could be used as a commercial facility."3 6
On May 15, 1969, the Washington Post, in an article entitled "Clash
Seen Over Jetport Plan," stated that a "head-on collision may be build-
ing up between the Departments of Transportation and Interior" over the
proposed Everglades Jetport. 137 This collision between the interests of
the Department of Transportation and the Department of Interior was
avoided, at least temporarily, by the announcement, on June 2, 1969,
that a six-man joint committee had been appointed to facilitate the co-
ordination of environmental and scientific studies concerning the jetport.
In addition, Dr. Luna Leopold, senior scientist with the U.S. Geological




During the summer of 1969, Dr. Leopold directed an ad hoc Depart-
ment of Interior study team which produced a 155-page report, com-
monly referred to as the "Leopold Report," entitled "Environmental
Impact of the Big Cypress Swamp Jetport."1 39 The Leopold Report con-
136. Resolution of the Dade County Port Authority, May 14, 1969.
137. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 3. The statements of Russell Train
and James Braman indicate that both Departments were to have taken an active role in
this and other studies related to the Everglades Jetport problem. The conservationists lobbied
during April and May to get the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation relieved of its normal
responsibilities in the jetport controversy. Interview, supra note 54; see text at note 54 supra.
138. Interior Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 4.
139. Interview with Dr. Leopold, Senior Scientist, U.S. Geological Survey, Department
of Interior, in Washington, D.C., April 22, 1971. The group consisted primarily of three
physical scientist-engineers, four biologists, two social scientist-economists and two tech-
nicians. Time expended on preparation of the Leopold Report was about three months, in-
cluding one week for formation of the problem and planning, two months for collection of
information and one month for writing and editing. About 41/2 professional man-months
were spent on the study with an estimated cost of $12,000. It was "intended to generate
a base of information for internal use, to support policy-making, and for the general in-
formation of the public and concerned groups." Hearings on Technology Assessment Before
a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 298
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Technology Assessment Hearings]. Art Marshall of the Vero
Beach office of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife served as the field coordinator and
was primarily responsible for the report's preparation. Interview, supra note 53.
The Leopold Report was to be a joint effort of the Departments of Interior and Trans-
portation, but the Department of Transportation had only a very limited role in its
preparation. The original plan was to collaborate and, in the event of disagreement, to
present the positions of both Departments. Dr. Leopold organized his Interior study team
which began work in South Florida in early summer, 1969. The Department of Transporta-
tion representatives were to begin work on their contributions which mostly pertained to
the areas of their own expertise. The Department of Transportation did not submit its
materials by the report's August 15th deadline and was not included. Consequently, Dr.
Leopold struck the Department of Transportation's name from the report, making it ex-
clusively an Interior report. Dr. Leopold attributes the eventual outcome of the controversy
to the fact that the Department of Transportation had no counter-report to offer in op-
posion to the Leopold Report. Interview, supra note 139. Asked why the FAA's material
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,cluded that the development of the jetport and its attendant facilities at
its proposed location would lead to land drainage and development for
agriculture, industry, transportation and services in the Big Cypress
Swamp. This type of development would "inexorably destroy the South
Florida ecosystem and thus the Everglades National Park."14 Even the
training airport was considered to be "intolerable" because it would
inevitably serve as a beacon for intensive land development in surround-
ing areas."
Three alternatives for future action were envisioned by the Report:
(1) proceed with staged, full-development of the jetport; (2) proceed
with final development and use of the training facility only, obtaining
an alternative site for expansion and permitting no new or improved
surface access to the site; or, (3) obtain an alternative site capable of
handling the training operation as well as the fully developed commercial
facility, with the training activities at the present site being abandoned
and transferred to the new site when appropriate. 42 The scientists viewed
the staged full-development of jetport, regardless of efforts for land-use
regulation, as resulting in the destruction of the ecosystem. The second
alternative use of the training facility, with no further expansion at the
site, would not preclude eventual development of surrounding land but
could, according to the study team, "reduce pressures for development
and secure time for the formation of sufficient public interest in environ-
mental conservation to achieve effective planning and land-use regula-
tion. 1 4 3 The last of the alternatives, the abandonment of the site with a
transfer of the training operations to a new site, according to the report,
would inhibit the forces tending toward development in Big Cypress
Swamp and would give an impetus to development of effective land-use
regulation.1
4 4
While the Leopold Report was being prepared, another scientific
evaluation was being undertaken during the summer of 1969. This eval-
uation was sponsored by the Environmental Studies Board of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.
The study was part of a larger effort by the Board to examine the
institutional base for dealing with the environment and managing en-
vironmental problems. 145 The project as a whole was supported by the
American Conservation Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the W. H. Kel-
was not submitted to the White House independently, an FAA official replied that the
decision was based not on scientific studies, but on politics. Interview, supra note 22.
140. Leopold Report, supra note 2, at 1. Land-use regulation was deemed ineffective to
prevent this result. Id. at 153.
141. Id. at 152.
142. Id. at 1-2.
143. Id. at 1.
144. Id. at 2.
145. This project by the Environmental Studies Board resulted in a two-part work:
'INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMUNT OF TEz ENVIRONMNT and ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLumS IN SouTu FLo=A.
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logg Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation. 48 Professors Marvin
L. Goldberger of Princeton and Gordon J. F. MacDonald of the University
of California at Santa Barbara, both physicists, headed the summer study
group which consisted of 12 full-time members, 14 part-time members,
and 34 observers, mostly from academic fields .'4  After a field trip to
Florida by a study committee, the larger group met at Stanford Univer-
sity during the month of August. Presentations were made to the group
by most of the parties connected with the controversy.'48
The National Academy Study attempted to anticipate the effect of
a proposed jetport on water conservation, ecology, disease and public
health, air and noise pollution, recreation and general conservation policy
in South Florida. The emphasis was placed on water management.149 The
Study concluded that the training airport operations would not appear to
pose a severe problem if various safeguards were instituted. 5 ° However,
the commercial airport, in their opinion, would raise more serious prob-
lems. The Study stated that the full environmental impact of the com-
mercial airport was not known. The study group recommended further
studies and regional planning prior to the initiation of a commercial jet-
port and associated transportation corridors at any site.
The Study's most specific conclusion was that a large portion of the
Big Cypress Swamp should be maintained as a natural water conservation
area. 1 ' The National Academy Study viewed inland development of
Collier County as the most serious environmental threat to the Ever-
glades. I52 Such a development would adversely affect the quality and
quantity of water flowing into the Everglades. Although it did not reach
the specific conclusion that this development could not be controlled
under existing circumstances and realities, the Study concluded that
zoning, limited access and other controls "do not appear to offer a real
146. Technology Assessment Hearings, supra note 139, at 298.
147. GRAY, supra note 35, at 1010. The breakdown of the full and parttime members
of the group along professional lines was: 12 physical scientists-oceanographers-engineers,
5 biologists/ecologists, 6 social scientists/economists, and 2 lawyers, with an Executive
Director. Technology Assessment Hearings, supra note 139, at 298.
148. Interview with Dr. MacDonald, Secretary, Council of Environmental Quality, in
Washington, D.C., February 26, 1971.
149. Id.
150. These safeguards include
control of flight patterns to avoid low passes over the Everglades, efforts to minimize
pollution about the training airport site, and zoning and other regulations in the
surrounding areas to discourage new residential and commercial activities.... How-
ever, to the extent the training.airport represents the first step toward a full develop-
ment of. the surrounding regions, its further development should await fuller study.
of how to safeguard the Everglades Park and other areas of South Florida.
NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDY, supra note 6, at 4.
151. Id. at 2. Professor Goldberger stated that most of the members of the study group-
would have preferred to see the jetport be built elsewhere, but the group lacked time to
explore other site possibilities. Nueller, Everglades Jetport: Academy Prepares a Model, 104
SCIENCE 202 (1969).
152. NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDy, supra note 6, at S.
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prospect of preventing a very serious challenge to the survival of the
Park, so long as the Big Cypress remains in private ownership." '53
While the Leopold Report and the National Academy Study were
being prepared, the Dade County Board of Commissioners retained the
Overview Corporation, headed by former Secretary of Interior Stewart
Udall, "to develop a balanced plan keyed to the overall future of South
Florida." '154 The Overview Report, entitled "Beyond the Impasse The
Dade Jetport and the South Florida Environment," appeared on De-
cember 10, 1969."1 The Overview Report was essentially a consulting
plan, and did not include an original scientific study. 5"
In contrast to the Leopold Report, which had viewed the planning
procedures and their application to be "presently not sufficiently uniform,
sophisticated, effective, or enforceable to provide any optimism that use
of the jetport ... would procede [sic] without concomitant land develop-
ment,"' 57 the Overview Report proposed a new approach to airport plan-
ning. Under this approach the jetport would become an airport engineered
to be pollution-free, a "clean enclave," connected with metropolitan pop-
ulation centers by a rapid transit system. 58 It thus took a much more
optimistic view of the current feasibility of comprehensive planning and
the capability of scientific knowledge to develop a "clean" airport. 5
Coupled with a proposal for a rapid-transit system linking the airport
with Miami, was a plan for an "environmental surcharge" on rapid
153. Id. at 5-6. One of the environmental problems discussed in the National Academy
Study and not in the other studies was the medical problem involved in the development of
an international airport in a tropical region. A few passengers each year would be incubating
malaria, dengue fever, filariasis or possibly, yellow fever. If one or two cases were discovered
at the jetport site, a massive mosquito control effort would doubtless be undertaken, possibly
extending deep into the Park. Such an action would have extremely devastating effects on the
environment. NATIONAL ACADEMY STUDY, supra note 6, at 24, 26.
154. GRAY, supra note 35, at 1011.
155. OVERVIEW CORP., BEYOND THE IMPASSE: THE DADE JETPORT AND THE SOUTH
FLORIDA ENVIRONMENT 6 (1969) [hereinafter cited as OVERVIEW REPORT]. The cost of this
study was $75,000. Interview with Stewart Udall, in Washington, D.C., February 24, 1971.
156. Interview with Stewart Udall, in Washington, D.C., February 24, 1971.
157. LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 2, at 152.
158. OVERVIEW REPORT, supra note 155. The Report concluded:
[A] conventional airport, with its supporting build-up of housing, industry and
ground transportation corridors would be unacceptable in terms of its costs to re-
gional environmental values. . . . Relocating the airport site will not, in itself, save
the Everglades. . . . [Tihe real threat to the Big Cypress is posed . . . by the
multipicity of private land-owners in the area who-jetport or no jetport-have
every right and every intention to develop their lands profitably.
Id. at 30.
159. Dr. Marshall, Field Coordinator for the Leopold Report, stated in an interview
that no one has yet defined or explained how this could be accomplished. Interview with
Arthur Marshall, in Miami, March 23, 1971. The National Academy Study did not foresee
the practical availability of the necessary technology in the near future. NATIONAL ACADEMY
STUDY, supra note 6, at 23. Even if the clean enclave concept is scientifically feasible, it is




transit users which would be used for the purchase of private holdings in
the Big Cypress Swamp.16 0 The Overview Report, however, did not offer
a detailed plan, but was only a starting point for further research.
The more pessimistic view of the Leopold Report seems to have been
influenced, at least in part, by the authors' view of the Port Authority's
past performance in environmental planning. Furthermore, when this
Report was written, the authors were faced with the reality of actual
construction being underway without any concomitant environmental
plan.
The Leopold Report was sponsored by a partisan interest, the De-
partment of Interior. Arthur Marshall of the Vero Beach office of the
Bureau of Sport Fisheries, who was field coordinator of the Interior
study team, had been involved in the submission of the list of environ-
mental planning questions to the Port Authority earlier that year. Also,
Marshall had personally presented the proposal for the inter-agency,
inter-governmental committee at the February 28, 1969, meeting with
the Port Authority.'" His background and interest are important because
the normal procedure of review, amendment, and check-off at several
intermediate levels was not followed. Rather, the Report went directly
from the study team to the office of the Secretary. 62
Since the state of scientific knowledge about the complex Everglades
ecosystem is comparatively primitive,163 a certain amount of subjectivity
in evaluation is possible. The representation of a partisan interest is an
important factor which affects the point of view adopted by a report as
well as the degree of optimism reflected by it in areas of discretionary
leeway.6 4 A private organization such as Overview is certainly in an
especially difficult position when hired by a partisan. Under such cir-
cumstances, there is a strong possibility of pressure for a particular result
which may lead to a direct or indirect effect upon its conclusions.
A study such as that sponsored by the Environmental Studies Board
of the National Academy of Sciences has the advantage of not being
connected directly with a participant in the controversy. In addition,
such a study provides the potential of using a highly-qualified study team
that could not be gathered under any other auspices nor at a comparable
160. OVERVIEw REPORT, supra note 155, at 41-42.
161. See text at note 115 supra.
162. Interview, supra note 54.
163. In the Everglades, there are 2,000 different species. Man never has had and probably
never will have resources to fully know about all of these species and to coordinate the
knowledge. To that extent, judgments about these species and the Everglades are subjective.
Interview, supra note 159.
164. The National Academy of Public Administration points out that technology assess-
ment in the Executive Branch suffers from two major drawbacks: (1) the assessments
usually are incomplete or promotionally biased, and (2) their conclusions are not consistently
conveyed to officials who can and should act upon them. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, A SYSTEM FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT FOR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
(Report to the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 1969).
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low cost to the public. This approach can bring together a great variety
-of viewpoints and insights." 5
VIII. RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY
Throughout June, July, August, and September 1969, the Ever-
glades Jetport received continuous newspaper and national magazine at-
tention, which was heavily in opposition to the jetport.0 0 By September,
protest mail to Governor Claude Kirk of Florida was running 50 to I
against the jetport.0 7 On September 10, 1969, in opening remarks made
by Secretary of Transportation, John A. Volpe, at a joint news confer-
ence with Secretary of Interior, Walter L. Hickel, and Florida Governor
Claude Kirk, Secretary Volpe stated:
We believe a training facility . ..can with proper safeguards
be utilized without having an adverse impact on the ecology of
the Everglades. However, the question of a commercial airport
at that location is very doubtful and needs much further study.
... [A]n acceptable solution must be found including the seek-
ing of alternative sites. 0
This decision to oppose a commercial airport but to permit a training
facility was made by the White House.0 9
The National Academy Report and the Leopold Report were re-
leased in mid-SeptemberY.7 0 Reacting strongly against the Leopold Re-
port, Miami Mayor Steve Clark charged the release of the Leopold
Report by Secretary Hickel as a "purely political decision" and blamed
Governor Kirk who, at that time, was suggesting a Palm Beach site for
the jetport.'71 The Port Authority alleged that substantial changes were
made in the circulated draft of the Leopold Report. 7 2 This charge was
emphatically denied by its authors. 8
165. Technology Assessment Hearings, supra note 139, at 295.
166. LAMBFRTON, supra note 17, at 16. The conservationists fed material to the news
media. A letter from Gary Soucie of the Sierra Club to Manuel Morris of the Department
of Interior stated that Time Magazine would run a story when the conservationists had
some "hard news leads" if Time was given the leads a few days before the newspapers.
Similar arrangements were made with several other national magazines.
167. Orlando Sentinal, September 10, 1969, § A, at 2, col. 2.
168. Department of Transportation News Release, September 10, 1969.
169. See note 185 infra.
170. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 16-17 (1969).
171. Florida Times Union, September 19, 1969, § B, at 2, col. 1.
172. Memorandum from Richard Judy, Deputy Director, Dade County Port Authority,
to Mayor Chuck Hall, September 8, 1969. In this letter the Deputy Director stated:
The rumors recognized by CBS News, WTVJ News and the Office of the Governor
and others had no foundation at the time they were originated. It is our belief that
they were originated as the last ditch stand to force rewriting of the "Dr. Leopold
Report" conclusions which we have good reason to believe were not negative to our
approach to developing the Dade/Collier site. We also have good reason to believe
that the U.S. Academy of Science report as originally drafted was positive in the
conclusions. ...
173. There is much suspicion on the part of the jetport proponents and some in the
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On October 13, 1969, Senators Gaylord Nelson, Clifford Case,
Phillip Hart and Henry Jackson sent a request to Secretary Volpe to
delay the opening of the training airport, scheduled for November 15,
1969, until the necessary studies were completed and sound environ-
mental decisions made.174 In reply, however, Secretary Volpe outlined
the safeguards under which the training airport would be allowed to open.
He stated that the available studies dealing with this project indicated
that a training facility could be operated without harm to the Park if
appropriate safeguards were instituted. These safeguards included main-
tenance of the historic water flow, water pollution control, wildlife, level
of jet air pollution, land use development control, control of overflights
and establishment of an environmental monitoring program . 7 5
A meeting between Secretary Volpe, Secretary Hickel and Governor
Kirk was planned for the week of November 17, to review the progress
made by the departments on the environmental problems posed by the
jetport and the conditions under which the training facility could be
operated.176 As a result of this meeting, Secretary Volpe requested that
the Port Authority voluntarily postpone the opening of the training air-
port.177 On November 25, 1969, Secretary Volpe, Under Secretary of
Interior Russell Train, members of the Florida Congressional delegation,
Governor Kirk and representatives of the Port Authority met in Wash-
ington. 78 Negotiation by an ad hoc committee of the Port Authority
and representatives of the two federal departments, of a formal agree-
ment for operation of the training facility was announced. 79 The need
for money from the federal government may have been a partial motiva-
tion for the Port Authority's entry into this agreement. 8 The Port Au-
Department of Transportation that the conclusions of the report were being rewritten during
this period. The authors of the report deny this charge. (Interviews with Dr. Leopold,
Manuel Morris and Art Marshall). The final report was submitted to Under-Secretary
Russell Train on August 15, 1969. Over a month passed before its release. Interior officials
explained this delay as being due to administrative disagreement among Interior agencies
over the wording of a letter of transmittal. In addition, there were negotiations with Trans-
portation, possibly on the content of the joint press release of September 10, 1969. Interview,
supra note 58; Interview, supra note 139.
174. Letter from Senators Gaylord Nelson, Clifford Case, Philip Hart and Henry Jackson
to Secretary of Transportation, John A. Volpe, October 13, 1969.
175. Letter from Secretary of Transportation, John A. Volpe, to Senators Gaylord
Nelson, Clifford Case, Philip Hart and Henry Jackson, October 29, 1969.
176. Department of Transportation, News Release (November 25, 1969).
177. SHEPARD, supra note 66, at 8.
178. Department of Transportation News Release, Nov. 25, 1969.
179. SHEPARD, supra note 66, at 8.
180. Congressman Yates of Illinois on November 18, 1969, proposed, and the House in
a non-record vote approved, a new section 309 of the Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1971, which stated that none of the funds under this
Act shall be available for the planning and execution of programs for the construction of
any airport in the State of Florida. On December 17, 1969, this bill was discussed on the
floor of the U.S. Senate. Senator Holland of Florida led a successful effort to change this
restriction to areas lying south of the Okeechobee Waterway. This became Section 310.
See SHEPARD, supra note 66, at 11.
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thority's primary motivation, however, appears to have been political.
It had a continuing need to deal with the Federal Government that made
it impossible to defy the Administration. 18'
On the recommendation of this ad hoc committee, the Port Au-
thority approved the agreement known as the "Everglades Jetport Pact."
It was signed in Miami on January 16, 1970, by Mayor Chuck Hall for
the Port Authority, Secretary Hickel for the Department of Interior,
Secretary Volpe for the Department of Transportation and Governor
Kirk for the State of Florida." 2 Collier County was intended to be a
fifth party but Collier County did not sign.183 The Jetport Pact was a
three-year agreement providing that the Port Authority make a new
comprehensive site selection study on the basis of site selection criteria
provided by the federal government. The Pact also provided that the
federal government would monitor training operations to determine their
environmental effects, conduct an environmental study of the region,
recommend a land-use plan for the Big Cypress Swamp, and supply the
Port Authority with reasonable criteria for site selection. 8
In a statement on January 15, 1970, President Nixon declared:
The agreement governing future airport construction in the
South Florida area is an outstanding victory for conservation.
Airport facilities already constructed on the site near the Ever-
glades National Park will be used as temporary training facil-
ities only. The training operation itself will proceed under
exacting environmental safeguards, and will be shut down as
soon as an acceptable alternative site is available .... We have
learned that the development of major facilities, such as a re-
gional airport, may have widespread environmental and social
consequences that cannot wisely be left entirely to local initia-
tive and local decision.'85
181. Interview, supra note 54.
182. GRAY, supra note 35, at 1037.
183. Id.
184. SHEPARD, supra note 66, at 9-10. As of this writing, a site selection committee
composed of representatives from the Department of Interior, Department of Transportation,
FAA, State of Florida and the Dade County Port Authority are considering several sites in
South Florida. Interview, supra note 54. The site on which the training runway was con-
structed is not being actively considered. Although many of the jetport opponents feel this
site is a dead issue, the Department of Transportation on January 15, 1971, urged the
White House to permit the site to be considered as a location for the commercial facility.
The White House refused. Letter from Joe Browder, Washington Director, Friends of the
Earth, to the Co-Chairman of the Everglades Coalition, January 23, 1971. With the
passage of time and a change in administrations, however, the federal position may change.
Some feel the Dade County Port Authority is deliberately slowing down the site search
with this in mind. Interview with Dan Paul, Attorney for the Everglades Coalition, in
Miami, March 22, 1971.
185. Statement by the President, January 15, 1970. The decision to stop the jetport
was made by President Nixon personally. (Source requested anonymity). It has been difficult
to ascertain exactly the nature of White House involvement but the following are such facts
as could be determined: The controversy came to the President's attention through the




The jetport controversy exemplifies problems encountered by in-
stitutions in assessing and coping with environmental issues. Decisions
on such projects as the jetport inherently involve determinations of social
priorities as well as assessments of harm. Institutional arrangements
which, for example, entrust a decision to a single purpose, mission-oriented
agency, can predetermine the weight to be given different interests by
the decisional process. Also, the inputs to a decision can be controlled
by the nature of the forum. There will be more and different inputs if
the forum is exposed to public debate than if a decision is made through
ex parte agency processes. The role of the scientific and technical expert
is central in environmental decisions. However, the expert's role may also
be that of an adversary. Many scientific judgments may cloak tacit policy
decisions. These problems must be recognized and efforts must be made
to devise new institutional arrangements for the wise management of
man's limited resources.
A. The Mission-Oriented Agency
A mission-oriented agency is ill-equipped to balance competing in-
terests. Usually, it is charged by statute with the furtherance of particular
programs or technology. Pressure from higher officials and Congress
induces the agency to show results. An agency frequently identifies its
particular mission with the national interest.18 By education and value
sent a memorandum to the Department of Interior in the spring of 1969, about the time
the Leopold Report was initiated. It is unclear if Erlichman's memo was a cause of the
study being undertaken. Interview with John Whitaker, White House Aide, in Washington,
D.C., April 24, 1971.
During the summer some lobbying occurred at the White House level. Several airlines
called Presidential Aide John Whitaker, but did not exert their full influence. There were
also some discussions between Whitaker and the Everglades Coalition. Interview with John
Whitaker, White House Aide, in Washington, D.C., April 24, 1971.
President Nixon discussed the Jetport with Secretaries Volpe and Hickel on several
occasions. Interview with John Whitaker, White House Aide, in Washington, D.C., April 24,
1971. In early September 1969, John Erlichman decided that a commercial airport at that
site was unacceptable. Secretary Volpe appealed Erlichman's decision to the President who
upheld Erlichman. (Source requested anonymity). Shortly after this, the Secretaries jointly
announced that a commercial airport at that site was doubtful.
In November 1969, the decision was made at the White House level that the training
airport would be moved as well. It was on these terms that an agreement with Dade
County was reached for the temporary operation of the training airport. Interview with
Nathanial Reed, Assistant Secretary of Interior, in Washington, D.C., May 20, 1971.
Opinions vary on the use made at the White House of the scientific studies, the Leopold
Report and the National Academy Report. Some say they were the basis for the decisions.
Interview, supra, note 139. Others say that the decision was purely political. Interview with
Dan Paul, Attorney for the Everglades Coalition, in Miami, March 22, 1971. It would seem,
however, that the studies and the political struggle are not really separable. The studies were
part of the public debate and influenced public opinion. At the same time, politics may have
played a role in shaping the studies. See text, supra at notes 161-165 and infra at notes
198-201.
186. Loevinger, The Administrative Agency as a Paradigm oj Government-A Survey
of the.Administrative Process, 40 Isw. L.J. 287, 308 (1965).
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orientation, the agency's personnel, e.g., the FAA engineer and the Park
Service biologist, will have difficulty understanding the problems and
viewpoints of other interests. 18 7 The particular public with which it
regularly deals often reinforces this bias. Thus, government agencies
become identified with private interests-the so-called "subgovernment"
phenomenon.' Often, as in the jetport controversy, the line between
lobbyist and government official blurs as the two seek to achieve some
common policy objective.18 9 The jetport dispute was a conflict between
two such subgovernments-the FAA, Port Authority, airlines and Miami
commercial community aligned against the Department of Interior and
conservationists.
One writer has appropriately observed of the agency view:
Each regulatory agency has been given a limited jurisdiction on
the theory that it deals with a complex subject that requires a
technical expertise. Specialization permits the establishment of
a staff of technical experts and the development of an institu-
tional expertise. It is sometimes overlooked, however, that tech-
nical expertise carries no greater political insight or social
wisdom; and indeed, in many cases the specialization that leads
to technical expertise may result in less insight and wisdom
than is possessed by a less specialized executive, judge, or
legislator.9 0
Recent environmental legislation does not confront the problem of
agency bias. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
requires the environmental impact of government actions to be con-
sidered, but leaves the final decision with the specialized agency.''
B. Decision by Controversy
The jetport dispute was ended by a form of public participation in
which the press played up the threat to the Park, interested pressure
groups met with high federal officials, and protest letters poured in. 9 '
The attention of high federal officials was not drawn to the jetport prob-
lem until the public controversy began.' 9 3 The decision of the White
House may have been directly influenced by the public outcry.
187. Interviews with both FAA personnel and Interior officials reveal even now an
inability to understand the problems and viewpoint of other agencies and officials.
188. See Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869 (1971).
Johnson discusses the close regulator-regulated relationship that often develops around
government-private interest contacts of long duration. This relation sometimes leads to the
"deferred bribe," i.e., the private job given the government official on retirement. Id.
189. See notes 64 and 133 supra.
190. Loevinger, supra note 186, at 309.
191. See National Environment Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, § 4331-§ 4335,
§ 4341-§ 4347 (1970).
192. Shortly before Governor Kirk came out against the Jetport, his mail was running
50 to 1 against the project. See note 167 supra.
193. The former Director of the. Office of Environmental- Impact of the Department of
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However, the desirability of solving environmental problems through
public controversy may be questioned. First, public attention is likely to
be attracted only by the more dramatic and visible issues. In the jetport
dispute, the underlying problem of private ownership of the Big Cypress,
which continues to leave the Everglades vulnerable to the same dangers
that the jetport was thought to represent, went largely unnoticed in the
public clamor over the airport.194 Second, public controversy is ill-adapted
to the consideration of subtle issues. Thus, alternatives such as permitting
the developers to use the site if they first produced a protective plan
acceptable to all interests and the Overview proposal for a clean enclave
airport and an environmental surcharge-were not given consideration. 9 '
It should also be remembered that the public that writes protest
letters is only part of the general public. In fact, much of the affected
public, e.g., consumers who would pay higher air travel rates in order to
pay for the more expensive, environmentally-engineered airports, is
silent.
Writing about an analogous situation, a former member of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission has stated:
A central problem is that by over-reacting to the individual com-
plaints of private citizens, investigations have been initiated
without regard for priorities. As a result, expensive projects of
limited importance have been authorized, while other, more
important violations, may go unchallenged.'96
There are, on the other hand, advantages to public input in decision-
making. The agency may be informed by interested elements of the public
and thereby be enabled to make a better decision. In the formation of
value judgments, exposure to public preferences may be a desirable in-
fluence on decision-makers. 9 7
Perhaps the opinions of interested members of the public should be
one factor considered by the decision-makers, in addition to opinions of
interested agencies and expert opinions from government, academic and
private sources. Rational planning requires structures that can bring
all these inputs to bear.
C. The Scientist and Policy Making
Scientists and scientific data are central to assessments of ecological
hazards. In the jetport dispute scientific data was often used by partisans
Transportation criticized the DOI bureaucracy for failing to communicate the full extent of
the problem to the upper levels of their departments. Interview, supra note 95, at 1. Inter-
departmental correspondence raised the problems of noise and overflights, but not the larger
problems of pollution and interference with water flow. See text at notes 71-75 supra.
Secretary Udall was never informed of the jetport problem. Interview, supra note 167.
194. See note 158 supra.
195. Id.
196. Hanes, Citizen Participation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible Ad-
ministrative Action, 24 Sw. L.J. 731, 738 (1970).
197. Id. at 736.
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to support previously adopted positions. For example, in the months
preceding the end of the controversy, the staffs of both the Interior and
Transportation Departments leaked conflicting scientific studies to the
press against the instructions of the Secretaries.'98
Three full-scale assessments of the jetport were undertaken. As
noted above, the scientists writing the Leopold Report were Interior
officials on record against the jetport. The Overview study used only one
ecologist and was under contract to the Dade County Commission. Of
the three reports, only the National Academy Study did not represent a
vested interest. The conclusions of each study reflected its sponsorship:
the Leopold Report (Interior) recommended against either a commercial
or training facility at that site; the Overview study (Dade County)
recommended building a clean enclave airport on state land ten miles
northeast; the National Academy study (private foundations) recom-
mended further investigation of effects before using the site for a com-
mercial airport. The National Academy, however, considered a training
airport with proper safeguards to be acceptable.
An examination of the three studies indicates the following three
points: First, all agreed that the development of the Big Cypress Swamp
would have a disastrous effect on the Everglades water flow in quantity,
quality and timing. However, the inevitability of this threat depended
on an assumption that only the Leopold Report was willing to make, i.e.,
that local government would not control or prevent that development.
Second, as to direct pollution from the airport, the Leopold Report de-
termined that there was no known technology for treating all the pollution
causes. The Overview Study took the position that the technology existed
or could be developed. Third, certain other hazards, such as bird-strikes
and air-pollution from jets, depended on speculative statistical data. The
Leopold Report concluded that there was danger of harm. The National
Academy and Overview Reports discounted both hazards.'99
Thus, the issues considered by the scientists, although technical,
were in part, speculative. To the extent that the scientists were also ad-
vocates for a particular result, their judgment as to speculative issues
may have been influenced. In addition, there were unstated value judg-
ments. For example, the statement that the airport should be built because
a clean enclave could be engineered subsumed the judgment that the
burden of a failure of technology or society to provide such an enclave
should fall on the environmental interests rather than on the developers.
In order to facilitate rational environmental decisions, sources of
scientific assessment without vested interests in the outcome of the dis-
putes are needed. The National Academy has recommended a National
Laboratory for Environmental Science to conduct systematic research on
the environment as a whole and maintain a capability of rapidly deploy-
198. Interview, supra note 89.
199. See section VII supra.
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ing a field force of scientists and technicians to analyze environmental
crises. The laboratory would be contractor-operated and funded by sev-
eral agencies in order to avoid bureaucratic restraints and the problem
of agency bias. It would also have the flexibility to tap research talent
from private, governmental and university sources.2"0
A separate Institute for Environmental Studies was proposed to con-
sider broad policy issues. The Institute would undertake long-range plan-
ning and study the social, political, economic, administrative, legislative
and other factors that influence environmental decisions. It would be
funded primarily by private sources, i.e., foundations, conservation groups
and industry.20 '
D. Governmental Design
Law allocates power and can do so by silence as well as by express
grant. Thus, the relative absence of regulation of land development in
the Big Cypress leaves land-use decisions to private owners.10 2 Federal
air space regulations that limit agency discretion to considerations of
safety and efficient use20 1 in effect require approval of airports whose
location may harm an infinite number of other values. A federal mandate
to the Park Service to preserve the wilderness character of the Park,0 4
without any enforcement power to protect the Everglades hydrological
system outside Park boundaries, made the mandate meaningless. The
absence of effective federal or state regulation gave special interests that
were local and economic in nature (in this case, the Dade County Port
Authority) the power to dispose of interests that were national and non-
monetary in character, or that accrued to other groups of people (tourists,
nature lovers, future generations, shrimp and fishing industries and
future water consumers) .205 The Port Authority, the agency with dis-
positive power in this situation, was answerable to certain other interests
such as the aviation industry, Miami commercial interests, and bond-
holders.2 06
It seems essential that procedures be devised that can accommodate
the conflicting interests. Public participation in decision-making is one
way of injecting non-mission inputs into the decisional process.
Requirements for adjudications or rulemaking procedures under the
Administrative Procedure Act might be the vehicle for balancing the
200. See generally REPORT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES-NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, INSTITUTIONS FOR EFFECTIVE
MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, Part I, 43 (1970).
201. Id. at 17.
202. See text at note 152, supra; See also Robinson, Tortious Water Use In Big Cypress
Swamp, 25 U. MIAMI L. REv. 690 (1971).
203. See note 43 supra.
204. See note 50 supra.
205. See notes 2-10 supra and accompanying text.
206. See text at note 64 supra.
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competing interests.2 7- The hearing examiner should preferably not be a
part of the mission-oriented agency, lest agency bias affect his decision..
20 8
One writer has cautioned that expedited hearing procedures will be neces-
sary to keep extended hearings from effectively defeating an agency's
mission.20 9 Another problem with public participation is that individual
members of the public may be unable to match the financial resources
of project backers. For this purpose, a Federal Counsel has been pro-
posed to represent at least some of the public objectors.2 10 This concept
has merit in that, selectively used, it could develop a body of agency
policy and law to guide future decisions.
Long-range resource-use planning may be the best solution because
it would occur before a particular controversy had developed to polarize
opinion and limit options. Some have advocated use of consultative pro-
cedures in which federal, state and local agencies, regional councils, in-
dustries and environmental groups would be involved.21 ' An amalgam of
these varied interests might be the proper vehicle for making resource-use
planning decisions. Such planning might entail inventorying available
land and resources, considering environmental value and estimated fu-
ture community needs (for power, agricultural, industry, etc.) and classi-
fying land according to its appropriate use.2 12 This approach-regional
zoning-would cut across narrow jurisdictional lines of counties and
cities, and would reflect a broad range of affected interests other than
merely local ones. These planning organs could also consider such prob-
lems as population control policies or water priorities that are beyond
the jurisdictions of single-purpose agencies and, yet, may be inseparable
from individual project decisions.
207. Miller, Ecology and the Administrative Process, 23 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 61 (1970);
Hanes, supra note 196, at 741.
208. Loevinger, supra note 186, at 308.
209. Hanes, supra note 196, at 738.
210. Miller, supra note 207, at 62.
211. Hanes, supra note 196, at 740.
212. LAMBERTON, supra note 17, at 34. The author calls for (1) inventory of natural
environment; (2) forecasts of socio-economic demand; (3) evaluation of costs; (4) decision
and establishment of criteria; and (5) enactment of legislative financing and implementation
[to acquire land or impose land-use controls].
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